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Endogenous public goodsIn most equilibrium sorting models (ESMs) of residential choice across neighborhoods, the question of whether
households rent or buy their home is either ignored or else tenure status is treated as exogenous. Of course,
tenure status is not exogenous and households' tenure choices may have important public policy implications,
particularly since higher levels of homeownership have been shown to correlate stronglywith various indicators
of improved neighborhood quality. Indeed, numerous policies including that of mortgage interest deduction
(MID) have been implemented with the express purpose of promoting homeownership. This paper presents
an ESM with simultaneous rental and purchase markets in which tenure choice is endogenized and neighbor-
hood quality is partly determined by neighborhood composition. The public policy relevance of the model is
shown through a calibration exercise for Boston, Massachusetts, which explores the impacts of various reforms
to the MID policy. The simulations conﬁrm some of the arguments made about reforming MID but also demon-
strate how the complex patterns of behavioral change induced by policy reform can lead to unanticipated effects.
The results suggest that it may be possible to reform MID while maintaining the prevailing rates of
homeownership and reducing the federal budget deﬁcit.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
“The beneﬁts of homeownership for families, communities and the
nation are profound.”— Elizabeth Dole, former United States Senator,
Housing and Urban Development hearing, 2003.
The promotion of homeownership has been a widespread and long-
term focus of public policy (Andrews and Sanchez, 2011). Support for
such policies derives both from political ideology and from a belief
that homeownership delivers positive spillovers. Homeowners, it is
argued, have greater incentives to invest in the physical and social
capital of their communities, thus providing private and public beneﬁts.
There is a substantial body of empirical evidence that lends credence to
this view. Homeownership is strongly correlated with property
condition and maintenance (Galster, 1983), neighborhood stability
(Dietz and Haurin, 2003; Rohe and Stewart, 1996), child attainment
(Bramley and Karley, 2007; Green and White, 1997; Haurin et al.,
2002), citizenship (DiPasquale and Kahn, 1999) and lower crime rates
(Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1996; Sampson and Raudenbush, 1997).17920014924 (Mobile).
t.day@uea.ac.uk (B. Day).
as to whether there is a direct
positive spillovers or whether
inclined to pro-social behavior.
. This is an open access article underA wide variety of policy measures have been implemented to
promote homeownership. Attempts have been made to encourage the
supply of mortgage lending; for example, in the U.S. through the
establishment of Government Sponsored Entities providing liquidity
and security for mortgage lenders. Policies have also been implemented
to encourage particular groups into homeownership; for example, in
the U.K. through the Right to Buy scheme for social housing tenants
and more recently the Help to Buy schemes for equity loans, mortgage
guarantees and new buyers (NewBuy). Homeownership has also been
promoted through the tax system e.g. through exemptions from capital
gains tax on property sales and mortgage interest deduction (MID).
MID, the focus of this paper, allows taxpayers to subtract interest paid
on a residential mortgage from their taxable income.
MID is present in the tax laws of many countries including the U.S.,
Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden and was
previously offered in the U.K. and Canada. It was introduced in the U.S.
in 1913 when the homeownership rate was 45.9%. Under MID and
numerous other initiatives, homeownership rose after the Second
World War reaching a peak of 69% in 20042. Currently, MID constitutes
the second largest US tax expenditure3 with the cost estimated to be
some $104.5 billion dollars in foregone tax revenue in 2011 (Ofﬁce of
Management and Budget, 2011).2 Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
3 The largest being the exclusion of employer contributions for medical insurance and
medical care.
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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creased scrutiny. It has been argued that rather than encouraging
homeownership the tax subsidy is simply capitalized into property
values making properties no more and potentially less affordable than
without the policy (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002; Hilber and Turner,
2010). Furthermore, critics contend that MID most greatly beneﬁts
high-income taxpayers who would likely be homeowners irrespective
of the tax incentives (Shapiro and Glaeser, 2003). Certainly higher
income households are more likely to own their homes, hold larger
mortgages and itemizemortgage interest payments on their tax returns
(Poterba and Sinai, 2008). Of course, courtesy of their higher incomes,
they also itemize at a higher rate (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002). As a re-
sult, in 2004 the government paid an average $5459 in MIDs to house-
holds earning over $250,000 compared to $91 for households earning
below $40,000 (Poterba and Sinai, 2008).
In the face of strong opposition, particularly on the part of ﬁnancial
services interests and housing lobbyists, repeated efforts to reform
MID in the U.S. have borne little fruit Ventry (2010)4. Over the last
three budget cycles the U.S. administration proposed reforms to MID,
but on each occasion those initiatives have failed to pass into law. The
key element of those proposals was to limit MID for households paying
the top marginal rates of income tax. Other proposals for reform in-
clude; replacing MID with a system of tax credits (Dreier, 1997;
Follain et al., 1993; Green and Vandell, 1999), scrapping MID in order
to fund cuts in federal income taxes (Stansel, 2011) and replacing MID
with a ﬁscal incentive open only to ﬁrst time buyers (Gale et al., 2007).
The debate is fueled by a lack of clarity with regard to how such re-
formswill play out. Clearly, eliminating theMIDwill increase the cost of
borrowing for the purposes of buying property and, ceteris paribus,
cause demand for owned properties to fall. This reasoning underpins
the National Association of Realtors claim that “eliminating the MID
will lower the homeownership rate in the U.S.”5. Of course, it is recog-
nized that the impact of eliminating the MID also depends on supply
conditions in the property market. The extent to which falling demand
translates into reductions in homeownership as opposed to falling
prices depends on the price elasticity of housing supply. Bourassa and
Yin (2008) estimate that for some groups the negative effect of losing
MIDmaybemore than outweighed by the positive effect of falling prop-
erty prices; homeownership amongst such groups could actually rise as
a result of eliminating the MID.
What is less widely recognized is that changingmarket conditions in
the property market will have ramiﬁcations in the closely associated
rental market. Falling demand for homeownership can translate into
rising demand for rental housing. More complex still is the interplay
between homeownership and the desirability of residential locations.
Since residential location choice is endogenous to the problem, elimi-
nating MID may not only encourage the movement of individuals
between ownership and rental but also the migration of households
between neighborhoods.
While numerous attempts have beenmade to identify the impacts of
eliminating the MID (e.g. Bourassa and Yin, 2008; Hilber and Turner,
2010; Toder, 2010) those studies have been based on a partial
characterization of the problem. This paper develops a model that
more completely describes the complex adjustments in spatially de-
ﬁned and interrelated property markets and uses that model to explore
some of the possible ramiﬁcations of MID reform.
The model developed in this paper is an equilibrium sorting model
(ESM) (Kuminoff et al., 2010). ESMs provide a framework within
which it is possible to examine how households choose their residential
location from a set of discrete neighborhoods. As reviewed in Section 2,4 InMarch 2011 Moe Veissi, the president elect of the NRA, launched a call for action to
Preserve, Protect and Defend the Mortgage Interest Deduction http://www.realtor.org/
governmentaffairs/mortgage interest deduction.
5 Statement byNAR Chief Economist Lawrence Yun at the “Rethinking theMortgage In-
terest Deduction” forum, Tax Policy Center, Washington, July 29, 2011.ESMs have been developed to examine a number of economic issues re-
lating to choice of residential location. As far as we are aware, however,
our model is the ﬁrst ESM to simultaneously model purchase and rental
markets while endogenizing tenure choice. In Section 3 the innovations
of the model are outlined in detail; particularly the speciﬁcation of a
neighborhood level of public good provision whose value depends, in
part, on endogenous levels of homeownership and the development of
an adjustment process to policy reform that accommodates capital gains.
To elucidate the pathways of adjustment that MID reformmay initi-
ate in property markets, Section 4 presents a simple two-jurisdiction
calibration of the model based on the 2000 census data for Boston,
Massachusetts. The calibrated model is used to simulate four different
MID reform proposals; capping MID at a rate of 28%, replacing MID with
refundable tax credits, scrappingMID and reducing income taxes and re-
placing MID with a lump sum payment to new owners. The simulations
allow us to examine several important questions with regard to MID re-
form. In particular, to explore how reforms may impact property prices,
levels of homeownership, the distribution of welfare across income
groups and the mixing of income groups within and across jurisdictions.
Our analysis suggests that, contrary to existing claims, with the right
policy design it may be possible to reform MID while maintaining the
prevailing rates of homeownership, increasing public goods provision
and contributing to a reduction in the federal deﬁcit.
2. Equilibrium sorting models
In essence, equilibrium sorting models (ESMs) provide a stylized
representation of the interactions of households, landlords and govern-
ment within a property market. Originally developed to explain
observed patterns of socio-economic stratiﬁcation and segmentation
in urban areas (e.g. Ellickson, 1971; Epple and Romer, 1991; Oates,
1969; Schelling, 1969; Tiebout, 1956), ESMs provide a formal account
of the process whereby heterogeneous households sort themselves
across the set of neighborhoods within a property market.
Neighborhoods, it is assumed, differ in quality according to the level
of public goods each provides. Those public goods may reﬂect purely
physical attributes of a location (for example, a neighborhood's proxim-
ity to commercial centers) or the levels of provision of local amenities
(for example, the quality of local schools). An important distinguishing
feature of ESMs is in allowing local amenity provision to be shaped by
endogenous peer effects; that is to say, by the characteristics of the set
of households that choose to locate in a neighborhood. Epple and Platt
(1998), for example, present a model in which local taxes and lump
sum payments are determined by the voting preferences of the
residents in a neighborhood; these computationally complex models
often have no closed form solution and are instead solved using numer-
ical computation. Similarly, Ferreyra (2007) and Nesheim (2002),
present models in which school quality is related to measures of the
average income of households in a locality.
In an ESM, the mapping of households to quality-differentiated
neighborhoods is mediated through property prices. Indeed, a solution
to an ESM is taken to be a set of property prices that support a Nash
equilibrium allocation of households to neighborhoods such that the
supply and demand for properties are equated in all neighborhoods.
While some simple ESMs have closed form solutions equilibria for
more complex models, particularly those including endogenous neigh-
borhood quality, are usually calculated using techniques of numerical
simulation (Bayer et al., 2004; Ferreyra, 2007).
Over the last decade ESMs have increased in popularity and com-
plexity. Recent modeling extensions allow for moving costs (Bayer
et al., 2009; Ferreira, 2010; Kuminoff, 2009), overlapping generations
(Epple et al., 2010) and simultaneous decisions in a parallel labor
market (Kuminoff, 2010). In addition, the ESM framework has been
used to explore empirical data on the distribution of households and
property prices in order to derive estimates of the value air pollution
(Smith et al., 2004), school quality (Bayer et al., 2004; Fernandez and
6 This simpliﬁcation is made at the cost of assuming, somewhat unrealistically, that
housing is continuously divisible and can be reconﬁgured without cost.
7 In reality housing is not homogenous, however, as Sieg et al. (2002) illustrated, if
housing enters the utility function through a sub-function that is homogenous degree
one, it is possible to construct a “housing quantity” index tantamount to an empirical an-
alog to the homogenous housing unit, h.
8 For simplicity, themodel assumes that all householdsmust take out amortgage. In our
simulations the mortgage interest rate is ﬁxed and the loan-to-value ratio is a function of
household income.
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have also been used to explore policy issues such as school voucher
schemes (Ferreyra, 2007), open space conservation (Klaiber and
Phaneuf, 2010; Klaiber, 2009; Walsh, 2007) and hazardous waste site
clean ups (Smith and Klaiber, 2009). A comprehensive review can be
found in Kuminoff et al. (2010).
One area that has received relatively little attention in the ESM litera-
ture is that of tenure. Indeed, the vast majority of ESM applications make
the assumption that households rent their properties from absentee
landlords. Where different tenure statuses have been considered, those
applications have treated tenure status as a ﬁxed characteristic rather
than a choice variable (Bayer et al., 2004; Epple and Platt, 1998). In real-
ity, of course, households choose from a number of tenure options, with
the key distinction being between ownership and renting. The joint deci-
sion of tenure and housing consumption has been examined in the real
estate literature. For example, King (1980) estimated preferences for
the UK housingmarket developing an econometric model of joint tenure
and housing demand. Similarly, Henderson and Ioannides (1986) con-
sider joint housing decisions in the US and Elder and Zumpano (1991)
developed a simultaneous equations model of housing and tenure
demand. For a number of issues, such as the reform of MID policy, the
choice of tenure is the central consideration of the policy debate.
Accordingly, one of the key contributions of this paper is to describe
an ESM inwhich tenure choice is endogenized. In ourmodel, household
choices whether to rent or purchase property are a function of market
conditions, including the endogenous provision of local public goods.
When policy reforms result in price changes in the property market,
homeowners and renters are affected differently. In particular,
homeowners will be impacted by capital gains (or losses) that are not
experienced by renters. The modeling framework developed in the
next section outlines a method for incorporating such distinctions.
3. The model
3.1. The economy
Consider a closed spatial economy consisting of a continuum of
households. The model is closed insomuch as households may not
migrate in or out of the economy. Households differ in their incomes,
y. They also differ in terms of their preferences over the amount of
housing they consume, β, and the value they attach to owning a proper-
ty, θ. Ownership preferences represent the private returns to home-
ownership that are not realized when renting. Such private returns
are motivated by numerous considerations including i) freedom
to modify housing, ii) satisfaction from homeownership status and
iii) anticipated ﬁnancial returns from capital gains. The distribution of
household types in the population is deﬁned by the joint multivariate
density function f(y, β, θ).
The economy is divided into a set of spatially discrete neighbor-
hoods, j = 1, …, J. In our model, each neighborhood is assumed to
have its own local government. As such, we refer to these areas as juris-
dictions. Each jurisdiction is characterized by a vector of local public
goods, gj = {zj,1 …, zj,U, qj,1,…, qj,V}, comprising U exogenous elements,
zj,u, and V endogenous elements, qj,v. The level of provision of endoge-
nous elements is determined by the composition of the set of house-
holds that choose to reside within a jurisdiction. The provision of
public goods is assumed to be homogenous within a jurisdiction.
3.2. The demand side
To reside in jurisdiction j household imust buy housing there. The
decision to rent, R, or own, O, housing is referred to as tenure choice.
We describe the set of tenure options as T = {R, O} Accordingly, our
model is characterized by households choosing to participate in one of
a number of propertymarkets each deﬁned by a jurisdiction and tenure
bundle, {j, t}.Households also choose a quantity of housing; a decision approxi-
mating real life choices over the size and quality of home to buy or
rent.6 Housing is deﬁned as a homogenous good that can be owned or
rented from absentee landlords at a constant per unit cost, pj, within a
jurisdiction7 (Epple and Romer, 1991; Epple and Sieg, 1998; Epple and
Platt, 1998; Bayer et al., 2004; Ferreyra, 2007).
The quantity of housing demanded by a household in market {j, t} is
denoted hj,t= h(p, g, τp; y,β, θ,m, δ). The two arguments in that function
yet to be explained (m and δ) concern the borrowing a household must
assume in order to purchase a property. In particular, to become a
homeowner a household must take out a mortgage8 and pay mortgage
interest,m, to the lender. Mortgage interest is paid only on the amount
borrowed, where that borrowing is determined by the value of
the housing purchased, pjhj,t multiplied by a loan-to-value ratio, δi.
Differences in δi can be interpreted as representing the varying abilities
of households to make a down payment. Property taxes τp are paid on
both rented and purchased housing.
Homeowners are permitted to itemize mortgage interest costs and
property taxes; that is, to deduct these costs from their taxable income.
Since the marginal rate of tax increases with income, the implicit
subsidy of itemization also increases with household income. However,
not all households choose to itemize.We use the variable item to denote
whether a household itemizes. Empirically itemization rates are higher
amongst high-income households. To account for this the model in-
cludes the probability that a household itemizes, which is expressed
as a function of household income,
Prob item ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ Ψ yð Þ ð1Þ
whereΨ(·) denotes a cumulative distribution function and,
item ¼ 1 if a household itemizes0 otherwise

Accordingly, the implicit subsidy a household, i, receives by itemiz-
ing mortgage interest and property tax payments on their tax return,
MID(p, h, τp, y, m, δ), is endogenous to the household's decision and
depends upon the purchase price of property (not including tax), p,
the quantity of housing demanded, h, the property tax rate, τp, and
household income, y (which in our model also determines the loan-
to-value ratio, δ, and the probability that a household itemizes).
Aggregate demand for housing in market {j, t} is calculated by inte-
grating across households,
HDj;t ¼ ∫∫∫ hj;t p; g; τp; y; β; θ;m; δ
 
f y;β; θð Þdy dβ dθ ð2Þ
3.3. The supply side
Housing supply is determined by property prices. Housing supply
may differ between jurisdictions due to factors such as zoning restric-
tions and available land. To account for this possibility the housing
supply function for a particular market j is denoted,
HSj ¼ Hsj p j
 
: ð3Þ
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Government operates at two levels, federal and local, serving the
dual roles of redistributing income and providing local public goods.
The federal government raises revenue through income taxes, charged
at a series of marginal rates, τy, which are an increasing function of tax-
able income. The tax paid by a household is taxy = taxy(y− MID, τy).
The total federal tax revenue is,
Ty ¼ ∫∫∫ taxy y−MID; τy
 
f y; β; θð Þdy dβ dθ ð4Þ
Federal tax revenues can be used to ﬁnance the provision of public
goods or to implicitly fund MID. The revenue foregone to MID is equal
to the integral of the MID payments across all households:
TMID ¼ ∫∫∫MID p; h; τp; y; m; δ
 
f y;β; θð Þdy dβ dθ: ð5Þ
It is assumed that the federal expenditure on local public good
provision is organized so as to allocate an equal amount of revenue
per household:
EFj ¼ SjTy ð6Þ
where Sj is the share of the population locating in jurisdiction j.
Local governments raise revenue through proportional property
taxes, τp,9 which are levied on the value of property. As such, the total
property tax revenue of jurisdiction j is,
Tp; j ¼ τppjHDj : ð7Þ
Local tax revenues increase as property prices increase, holding
aggregate housing demand ﬁxed, and as aggregate demand increases
holding prices ﬁxed. Local tax revenues are used to ﬁnance expenditure
on public goods.
ELj ¼ Tp; j ð8Þ
Total expenditure on local public good provision, therefore, is equal
to the sum of federal and local expenditure:
E j ¼ EFj þ ELj : ð9Þ
3.5. Local public goods
Households derive utility from the combined provision of local
public goods, represented by the index,
g j ¼ ΣUk¼1 γkz j;k þ ΣVk¼1 γkq j;k ð10Þ
where γk is the weight placed on the kth element in g. For simplicity we
consider the case where gj consists of only one exogenous, z, and one
endogenous, q, public good:
g j ¼ zj þ γqj ð11Þ
where γ is the weight that households place on q relative to z and is
uniform across households and jurisdictions. Our speciﬁcation implies,
therefore, that households agree on the ranking of jurisdictions in
terms of the level of their provision of local public goods.9 Our model considers exogenous tax rates, the extension to endogenous rates, for ex-
ample through a majority vote, would be an interesting avenue for future research (inter-
ested readers are directed to Epple and Romer, 1991; Epple and Platt, 1998 for previous
ESMs with endogenous tax rates).Endogenous public good provision within a jurisdiction is an
increasing function of three inputs; government expenditure, Ej, the
homeownership rate, ρj, and other characteristics of the community of
households in that jurisdiction, xj, such that,
qj ¼ q E j;ρ j; xj
 
ð12Þ
dqj
dE j
≥ 0;
dqj
dρ j
≥ 0 and
dqj
dxj
≥ 0: ð12bÞ
Notice that our speciﬁcation assumes that public good provision is
increasing in the homeownership rate: a relationship that might
imply homeownership has a direct effect on local public good provision
or that homeownership simply proxies for unobserved inputs that
themselves have a direct effect. The presence of xj in the public good
production function deﬁnes a peer effect whereby community charac-
teristics, perhaps median household income, affect the provision of
public goods. Such peer effects have considerable empirical support
(Nechyba, 2003) and have been incorporated in a number of existing
ESM speciﬁcations (Nesheim, 2002; Ferreyra, 2007).
3.6. The household optimization problem
Households derive utility from local public goods, g, consumption of
housing, h, and other consumption, c. Preferences for local public goods
are determined by parameter α, which is assumed to be constant across
households. Meanwhile, housing quantity preferences are determined
by parameter β, which is assumed to vary across households.
Our model also allows for the fact that households can derive more
utility from housing when they own their home than when they rent
it (or vice versa). Each household is characterized by values for the pref-
erence parameter set θ, which scales the utility derived from housing in
the utility function for home owning.
Household utility is deﬁned by the function,
U j;t ¼ U h; t; c; y; α; β; θ; gð Þ ð13Þ
The household optimization problem can be decomposed into two
stages. First, a household calculates its optimal housing and consump-
tion choices for each market. The conditional maximization problem is,
max h;cj j;t U h; t; c; y; α; β; θ; gð Þ ð14Þ
s.t.
y ¼
τy þ 1þ τp
 
pjhj þ c t ¼ R
τy þ 1þ τp þmδ
 
pjhj þ c t ¼ O
8<
: :
Notice that the model expresses the decision-relevant information
in the form of yearly costs and beneﬁts. Hence the objective function
should be interpreted as an annual utility function and the constraints
express the annual costs associated with either renting or owning. The
optimization problem yields the following conditional indirect utility
functions,
V j;t ¼
V p; g; τp; y;α;β
 
t ¼ R
V p; g; τp; y;α;β; θ
 
t ¼ O
8<
: j ¼ 1; 2; …; Jð Þ: ð15Þ
Finally, households select the jurisdiction and tenure combination
that maximizes their level of utility.
11 TheMatlab code is available from the authors upon request. The authorswould like to
thank Kerry Smith, Dennis Epple andMaria Ferreyra for providing data and copies of their
code for solving other ESMs.
12 Epple and Romer (1991) demonstrated the existence and properties of a pure charac-
teristics equilibrium sortingmodel. These properties are: i) stratiﬁcation— each neighbor-
hood is occupied by households within a certain set of income and preferences, ii)
boundary indifference — ranking neighborhoods by price, there exists a locus of house-
holds deﬁned by their income and preferences who are indifferent between any two con-
secutive neighborhoods and iii) ordered bundles— the price ranking of neighborhoods is
the same as the ranking of neighborhoods by their public goods index. These properties
hold under the assumption that indifference curves exhibit the single crossing property
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An equilibrium of the model is deﬁned by a one to one correspon-
dence of households to the set of jurisdictions and tenure choices, and
an associated house price (not including taxes), p = {p1,…, pJ}, and
property tax rate, τp, for each jurisdiction, such that:
1. Each household resides in the jurisdiction and tenure thatmaximizes
utility given the equilibrium vector of prices and endogenous public
good provision.
2. All housing markets clear, Hj
D ¼ HjS; ∀ j.
3. All local government budgets balance, E jL = Tp,j, ∀ j.
4. Federal government spending is equal to the tax revenue paid to the
government, Ty = Σ j = 1J E jF.
5. There is a perfectly elastic supply of mortgage loans.
3.8. Simulating responses to exogenous policy change
In reality policy changes occur in a world in which households
already rent or own existing properties. That reality inﬂuences the out-
come of a policy change in at least twoways. First, changes take place in
the context of an existing housing stock whose quantity and location
has been determined by households' initial choices. Second, a house-
hold's current tenure status determineswhether their choices following
the policy change are inﬂuenced by capital gains.10 To see that more
clearly, it is instructive to brieﬂy contemplate how market changes im-
pact differently on renters and owners.
Consider a change that leads to increased house prices. When prices
go up existing renters are unable to afford their current consumption
bundle. Households can respond in a number of different ways. They
can alter their tenure choice, they can move to another location where
property prices are lower or they can reduce their demand for housing
and consumption. Indeed, they could do any combination of these. In
contrast, owning a property prevents rises in prices from making the
current consumption bundle unaffordable; homeowners are shielded
against price increases. Instead, a rise in prices presents homeowners
with the opportunity to sell-up and use the capital gains to increase
consumption or relocate to a jurisdiction that provides more desirable
public goods.
To simulate the process of adjustment in the propertymarket within
the context of what is essentially a static model requires some careful
consideration. We ﬁrst assume that the market is in a state of long-
term equilibrium, an equilibrium achieved under the baseline policy.
Households have optimally chosen where to live, whether to rent or
own and how much housing to consume. To reﬂect that state of the
world, we imagine a property market in which all the housing units
demanded under that baseline policy have been constructed and
that these existing housing units cannot be demolished in the face of a
policy change (though they can be repackaged and new units may be
constructed).
The policy change is introduced to this world at a point after
homeowners have paid for their current properties at the pre-change
prices but before rent has changed hands, consumption goods have
been bought and taxes andmortgage interest have been paid. As a result
of the policy change, households reconsider their choices of housing
quantity, location and tenure status and the model is solved for the set
of property prices that bring the market back to equilibrium under the
changed conditions. For, households that were previously renting,
things are relatively simple: they either buy or rent at the prices
determined by the new equilibrium. In contrast, having bought at the
prices characterizing the old equilibrium, households that previously10 Other authors have examined the importance of moving costs in equilibrium sorting
models (Bayer et al., 2009; Kuminoff, 2009). Like capital gains, moving costs can vary de-
pending on the household's initial position and have the potential to alter the shape of the
equilibrium that results from a policy change.owned must make their new housing decisions in light of the fact
that the new price conditions may present them with capital gains or
losses.4. Simulating MID reforms
Themodel developed above provides a rich environment inwhich to
explore the general equilibrium consequences of reformingMID policy.
Within that environment the impact on government expenditure,
patterns of community composition, homeownership rates and the
levels and distribution of household welfare can be considered simulta-
neously. To undertake this exercise it is preferable to examine a model
that replicates the real world. Such a model requires reasonable but
tractable functional forms that can be calibrated to produce a model
resembling a real world property market. Following the convention of
Epple and Platt (1998) we speciﬁcally model Boston, using updated
data for 2000. To provide a clear and accessible illustration of the path-
ways of change that operate in light of a policy reform it is prudent to
consider a simple two-jurisdiction version of themodel. While it is em-
inently possible to investigate problems with many more jurisdictions,
this simpliﬁcation enables us to most clearly characterize the chain of
reactions that occur within property markets in response to policies
that reform MID. The model is coded in Matlab11 and uses simulation
and iterative numerical techniques to solve for market clearing prices
and provision of endogenous public goods (Lagarias et al., 1998)12.4.1. The proposed policy reforms
The current debate regarding reform of MID policy is motivated in
part by the large U.S. deﬁcit. Indeed, as part of plans to reduce that def-
icit, President Obama submitted federal budget proposals in 2011, 2012
and 2013 that advised capping itemized deductions, including MID, at
28%. Each time Congress has rejected the recommended tax reforms.
All the same, we take the proposal of capping MID at 28% as our ﬁrst
potential policy reform. To be clear, under the current tax system
homeowners are permitted to deduct mortgage interest and property
tax payments from their taxable income when calculating their income
tax bill. Those in the top three income tax brackets, therefore, are enti-
tled to an implicit rebate on those expenditures at their marginal tax
rates of 31%, 36% and 39.6% respectively. The cap limits that implicit
rebate to 28%.
Three alternative MID-reform policies are also considered: a refund-
able ﬂat-rate tax credit; an income tax reduction; and a New Owner
Scheme. To compare the various proposed policies, we make the as-
sumption that the central motivation for reform to theMID is reduction
of the budget deﬁcit. Accordingly, we calculate the reduction in deﬁcit
brought about by our baseline reform of a 28% cap onMID. The three al-
ternative MID-reform policies are tailored to ensure that they facilitate
the same reduction in the budget deﬁcit as the cap.13and utility is monotonically increasing in its attributes. Due to endogeneity, the unique-
ness of the equilibrium is not guaranteed. One way to explore this is to alter the initial
values used in the code. In the simulations discussed below, this procedure had no inﬂu-
ence on the outcomes, suggesting uniqueness of each equilibrium.
13 Revenue equivalent policies were found using a search process.
Table 1
2000 Boston.
2000 Boston
y Mean income 74.119
ymedian Median income 55.183
ρ Homeownership rate 0.72
z Mean air quality (NOx) 3
q Mean school quality 420
15 Property values for owners were transformed into annualized user costs using a
Poterba (1984) factor.
16 Equilibria were also characterized for a range of alternative calibrations to explore the
sensitivity of the results to the parameterization and to allow consideration of the range of
permissible outcomes. The results remain qualitatively unchanged and are not reported
here, however a full set of results is available from the authors upon request.
17 The baseline model was also run for population sizes of 500 and 10,000. This did not
alter the results and conclusions drawn.
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placing MID with a refundable14 ﬂat-rate tax credit has been advocated
by both the Center for American Progress, who propose a 15% refund-
able tax credit, and the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility
(Moment of Truth, 2010), who propose a 12% non-refundablemortgage
interest tax credit. For the purposes of our simulations, we model this
reform as being a policy change in which MID is abandoned and,
instead, all households who are owners can claim back a ﬂat-rate per-
centage of their mortgage interest and property tax costs. As explained
previously, the ﬂat-rate we apply in our subsequent simulations is cho-
sen such that federal budget savings achieved by this policy are identical
to capping MID at 28%.
Our second alternative MID-reform policy follows the proposal
made by the Reason Foundation (Stansel, 2011) to scrap MID and in-
stead introduce a revenue neutral reduction in federal income tax for
all households. Here, we consider a policy in which MID is abandoned
and a portion of the savings in government expenditure are used to
fund an equal percentage reduction in income tax for all households.
Again, to ensure comparability across our policy simulations the level
of income tax reduction is chosen such that the policy achieves the
same reduction in the federal government budget deﬁcit as the other
proposed reforms.
Our ﬁnal alternative MID reform policy takes motivation from the
First Time Buyers scheme proposal made by Gale & Gruber (2007),
which suggests scrapping MID and introducing a refundable payment
to ﬁrst-time buyers in the ﬁrst year after a property is purchased. In
the model this is achieved through a New Owner Scheme, which
makes an equal lump sum payment to new homeowners. Again in our
simulations the level of payments to these ﬁrst time buyers is chosen
so as to ensure comparability in the reduction of the federal budget
deﬁcit across reforms.
4.2. Calibration
To conduct the simulations, speciﬁc functional forms are selected for
the structural equations of themodel. Following Epple and Platt (1998),
parameter values for the functions were calibrated such that our model
approximates the reality of the Boston Metropolitan (PSMA) area;
though in our application we take data for Boston from 2000 and not
1980. Table 1 presents a summary of important statistics for Boston in
2000 and Table 2 summarizes the parameters obtained by calibrating
the model to that reality. The assumptions and methods used in deriv-
ing those parameters are explained in the following sections.
4.2.1. Jurisdictions
To allow the pathways of response toMID reform to be studied with
reasonable clarity, we explore a simple two-jurisdiction version of the
model. Extensions to multiple-jurisdiction models are relatively easy
to implement, but greatly reduce the tractability of interpretation.
Again following Epple and Platt (1998), we begin by dividing the Boston
Metropolitan area into two jurisdictions, labeled A and B. Jurisdiction A
provides a higher level of exogenous local public goods provision,
consequently attracting a larger share of the population. Competition
for access to public goods increases the price of housing in A relative
to B, which leads to some income segregation. As a result the median
household income in jurisdiction A is higher than that of B.
4.2.2. Households
Households in the model are characterized by three parameters;
income, y, housing preference, β, and ownership preferences, θ. The
ﬁrst step in calibrating this model, therefore, is to establish the joint dis-
tribution of those parameters amongst the residents of Boston in 2000.14 Here the term ‘refundable’ indicates that households whose income tax liability is
lower than the value of the credit actually receive a payment from the Treasury covering
that difference.Asmade explicit shortly, a Cobb–Douglas utility function is assumed
such that a household's housing preference, βi, is related to the propor-
tion of their income that they spend onhousing. That data alongwith in-
formation on household income, yi, is available from the census which
provides a cross-tabulation of the share of income spent on rent (and
equivalently on monthly owner costs for owner–occupiers) by income.
Accordingly, to establish the joint distribution of y and β we use
maximum likelihood estimation to ﬁt a bivariate-normal distribution
flny, β) ∼ N(μf, Σf) to 2000 census data for Boston.15 Parameter values
from that estimation are recorded in the ﬁrst row of Table 2. Notice
that β is negatively correlated with y, such that while high-income
households spend absolutelymore on housing than low-income house-
holds, that expenditure constitutes a smaller proportion of their income.
For simplicity, and due to a lack of existing empirical evidence, it is
assumed that household ownership preferences, θ, are independent of
income and housing preferences. Accordingly, values were drawn
from a lognormal distribution ln(θ) ∼ N(μθ, σθ2) with mean and variance
chosen such that the baseline model predicts homeownership rates
comparable to those observed in Boston in 2000.16 The parameters
selected through that procedure are also recorded in Table 2. For the
purposes of simulating our model, we create a sample of 2000 house-
holds with income, y, and preference parameters, β and θ, drawn from
the calibrated distributions.174.2.3. Taxes
In 2000, Federal income taxes were structured into six marginal tax
brackets. Those tax brackets are deﬁned by a lower bound income,yτy, at
which the marginal tax rates, τy, becomes payable. The ﬁrst bracket
ranging from an income of $0 to $7350 has a marginal tax rate of zero.
Accordingly, $7350 is often referred to as the standard deduction. The
tax brackets and associated marginal tax rates are recorded in Table 2.
Table 3 illustrates how the income tax payable is calculated for house-
holds in each of the tax brackets.
The property tax rate, τp, was set at the average level for Boston
in 2000 using data supplied by the Massachusetts State Government.
To capture the correlation between income and itemization rates,
the probability of a household itemizing was calibrated using data on
itemization rates by income from Poterba and Sinai (2008) which is
reproduced in Table 2.18
In this calibrationwemodel property taxes as if they are fully passed
on to renters. This is aligned with a simpliﬁed interpretation of the
economy in which housing is constructed and supplied at marginal
cost including property taxes. In this situation, a competitive market
would lead to the full incidence of the tax being levied upon renters.18 MID is only itemized when the value exceeds $50. Other than this constraint, we do
not model a direct relationship between the probability of itemizing and the value of
mortgage interest that a household is eligible to deduct. Future work may beneﬁt from
considering this potential endogeneity.
Table 2
Calibrated parameter values.
Table 3
Income tax brackets 2000.
Bracket Income is greater than… But less than… Tax payable is…(taxy)
1st 0 7350 0
2nd 7350 21,925 0 +15% × amount over 7350
3rd 21,925 52,975 2186.25 +28% × amount over 21,925
4th 52,975 80,725 10,880.25 +31% × amount over 52,975
5th 80,725 144,175 19,482.75 +36% × amount over 80,725
6th 144,175 – 42,324.75 +39.6% × amount over 144,175
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property market model and the development of a buy-to-let market
to expressly model differences in the tax burdens of owner–occupiers,
landlords and renters.194.2.4. Mortgages
In our model there is a perfectly elastic supply of mortgages
such that the mortgage lending rate is unaffected by the demand for
mortgages. The size ofmortgage needed by a homeowner is determined
by their loan-to-value ratio parameter, δi. For the purposes of the
simulation, the relationship between loan-to-value ratio and household
income was estimated empirically using data from the Survey of19 The sensitivity of our results to the assumption of a 100% tax incidence for renterswas
tested by varying this rate, the patterns of behavior remain the same for incidence rates
between 60 and 100% although the magnitude of various effects are sensitive to this
parameter.Consumer Finances presented in Poterba and Sinai (2008). Using that
estimated relationship the parameter δi was calculated as,
ln δi ¼ δ0−δyyi ð16Þ
where δ0 and δy are the estimated regression coefﬁcients presented in
Table 2. Since δy is positive, wealthier households face lower loan-to-
value ratios and, as a consequence, lower marginal costs of purchasing
housing. The mortgage interest rate, m, was set to the average level
for Boston in 2000 using data supplied by the Federal Housing Finance
Association.
4.2.5. Housing supply
Housing supply is speciﬁed using a Cobb–Douglas function following
Epple and Romer (1991) and Epple and Platt (1998),
HSj ¼ Ajpηj ð17Þ
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factors such as local zoning restrictions, pj is the user cost of a unit of
housing in j and η is the price elasticity of housing supply. Based on
the estimated housing elasticity for Boston in 2000, see Saiz (2010), η
is set to 1 in all markets for the baseline simulation.20
The assumption of a single housing supply function covering rental
and purchase properties is motivated by considering the direct sale or
rent of housing from a zero-proﬁt housing constructor. If property is
supplied in a single market, constructors must be indifferent between
renting and selling properties. If they sell a property at marginal cost,
they are no longer responsible for maintenance, depreciation and
foregone interest. If the property is rented the constructor must include
these costs in the rental price in order to break even. As a result, if
housing for rent and purchase is produced for sale in a single market,
both renters and purchasers must face the same per unit user cost of
housing, although technically rents exceed purchase prices since
homeowners pay the remaining user costs (e.g. maintenance costs)
directly rather than to the constructor.21
4.2.6. Local public goods
For simplicity, the calibrated model considers one exogenously
determined local public good and one endogenously determined local
public good. The extension to multiple local public goods is trivial, but
adds complexity to the interpretation of the simulation results.
We use air quality to act as a representative exogenous local public
good. In our simulation, air quality is deﬁned in units of concentration
of nitrogen oxides (measured in pphm) below the highest level ob-
served in Boston in the Massachusetts Air Quality Report. Using that
measure, the mean level for air quality in Boston in 2000was 3. Accord-
ingly we set air quality in jurisdiction B to that level but assume that
jurisdiction A offers a slightly higher level of provision: 4.
In addition, we take school quality to act as a representative endog-
enous local public good; that is to say, a local public goodwhose level of
provision is determined by the propertymarket decisions of households
choosing to reside in a jurisdiction. School quality is a natural choice in
this regard since empirically it is correlated with many other measures
of local public good provision (Bayer et al., 2004; Black, 1999; Bramley
and Karley, 2007). Following Nechyba (2003), Nechyba and Strauss
(1994), Ferreyra (2007) and Fernandez and Rogerson (1998) we
model school quality as being determined by a production function
whose arguments include government expenditure per pupil, E, and
median household income, ymedian. To that list of arguments we add a
term relating to homeownership: an extension supported by an increas-
ing body of evidence suggesting school quality is determined, in part, by
levels of local homeownership (Dietz and Haurin, 2003; Dietz, 2002,
2003). Our school quality production function takes the form;
qj ¼ AEϕ1j ymedianϕ2j ρ1−ϕ1−ϕ2 ð18Þ
where A is a constant and ρ is the homeownership rate. This produc-
tion function implies that the level of local public good provision is in-
timately related to property market choices: ﬁrst through the income
levels of those that choose to reside in a jurisdiction, second through
the property taxes those individuals pay which determines budgets
for local government expenditure, third through the levels of itemiza-
tion those households pursue which determines federal contributions
to local expenditure and ﬁnally through the direct effect of local rates
of homeownership.20 Alternatively, η could be set to 0 to produce a completely inelastic housing supply.
21 In alternative calibrations of the model we considered independent purchase and
rental markets. Despite relaxing the arbitrage assumption we observed a high degree of
price convergence between rent and purchase price in equilibrium. In reality the supply
side is a compromise between the two extremes of a single property market model and
an independent markets model.To calibrate the production function, we use an instrumental vari-
ables approach on a national-scale dataset, regressing a state-levelmea-
sure of school quality (combined fourth grademathematics and reading
attainment score) against state-level measures ofmedian household in-
come, homeownership rates (both taken from 2000 census data) and
data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) on
expenditure per pupil. To dealwith thepotential endogeneity ofmedian
income and homeownership, we adopt an instrumental variables ap-
proach employing as instruments measures of the average median in-
come, homeownership rate and expenditure per pupil of neighboring
(geographically) states. The validity of the instruments was examined
using the Stock and Yogo (2005) test, under the null hypothesis that
the set of instruments is weak. Using both the 2SLS and LIML measures
we reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments at the 5% signiﬁcance
level with an eigenvalue of 22.3873 and corresponding critical values at
the 5% level of 16.87 (2SLS) and 4.72 (LIML). The resulting regression
equation was,22
ln qð Þ ¼ 2:515
0:417ð Þ
þ 0:17
0:053ð Þ
ln Eð Þ þ 0:17
0:071ð Þ
ln ymedianð Þ
þ 0:66
0:088ð Þ
ln ρð Þ
:
ð19Þ
To test the sensitivity of our simulated equilibria to the assumption
that homeownership directly impacts on local school quality, we
explore two versions of the model. In the ﬁrst version, a direct affect is
assumed away. Rather homeownership is taken to proxy for a set of
omitted factors that impact directly on school quality through channels
that are independent of property market decisions. Since those omitted
factors are taken to be unchanging, we progress by exogenously ﬁxing
the homeownership argument in the school quality production func-
tion at the observed Boston state average. In our simulations, the argu-
ment maintains that initial level despite adjustments in rates of
homeownership that result from changes in MID policy. In the second
version of the model the assumption of a direct affect is maintained.
In our simulations, the homeownership argument in the school produc-
tion function updates in response to changes in property market deci-
sions brought about by reforms of MID policy.
The results reported in Section 4 are derived from the ﬁrst model
version, assuming local homeownership has no direct impact on
school quality (although local endogeneity is still present through ex-
penditure per pupil and median incomes). Comparable results from
the secondmodel version, with an endogenous homeownership feed-
back, are presented in Section 5.2. Additional results exploring the
sensitivity of the results to sample size, the strength of preferences
for public goods and alternative housing supply speciﬁcations are
available from the authors upon request. As a general comment, the
patterns of relocation suggested by the model are the same for both
versions under each reform. It is notable, however, that when local
homeownership rates are assumed to directly affect the provision of
local public goods themagnitude ofwelfare gains associatedwith reforms
that increase homeownership rates are sensitive to this assumption.
4.2.7. Household preferences
The household utility function is speciﬁed as a Cobb–Douglas
according to23:
U j;t ¼
g jh
βc1−α−β t ¼ R
g jθ1 h−θ2
 βc1−α−β t ¼ O
(
ð20Þ22 Standard errors are shown in parentheses. In the computed equilibria, income and ex-
penditure are deﬂated to match the school production function, which was estimated in
2002 dollars.
23 The authors would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the structure
of ownership preference.
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tity of housing that must be purchased before additional utility from
homeownership is realized and θ1 is a household speciﬁc ownership
preference. Larger values of θ1 imply a greater preference for ownership.
Carbone and Smith (2008) show that when household preferences
are assumed to be Cobb–Douglas, preference parameters for non-
market goods can be retrieved using estimates of the implicit prices of
those non-market goods taken from hedonic pricing exercises. While
the procedure seems a little at oddswith the general equilibriumnature
of the equilibrium sorting model, the calibration technique can be
shown to be valid under the assumption that the market in which the
original pricing study was conducted was in equilibrium. Under those
circumstances implicit prices for public goods provide direct evidence
of preference structures. Here we take the implicit price of air quality,
pz, from the hedonic study by Harrison and Rubinfeld (1978) and the
implicit price of school quality, pq, from the hedonic study by Bayer
et al. (2007)24. Following Carbone and Smith, preferences for public
goods, α, and the weighting parameter, γ, can then be calculated
according to
α ¼ pzz0 þ pqq0
yþ pzz0 þ pqq0
ð21Þ
γ ¼ pq
pz
ð22Þ
where pz and pq are implicit prices for air quality and school quality re-
spectively, and subscript 0 denotes a baseline value. The calibrated
values from this procedure are 0.35 for α and 0.03 for γ.
4.3. Results
The long-run equilibriumunder current policy conditionswas calcu-
lated for our simulated sample of 2000 households.25 The impact of
MID-reformwas then investigated using an iterative solution algorithm
to calculate the new equilibrium characterizing the property market
when each of our four proposed policy reforms was instituted from
that baseline.
Tables 4 and 5 describe important features of the equilibrium in the
baseline and for each policy-reform scenario. Table 4 presents a charac-
terization of those equilibria in terms of the composition and character-
istics of the households in each jurisdiction. Table 5 characterizes the
equilibria from the perspective of households in each of the six tax
brackets. Throughout our discussion of the results we will use the
term “price” to refer to the price inclusive of property tax since this is
the effective price faced by households.
4.3.1. Baseline with MID
Consider the results displayed in the ﬁrst rows of Tables 4 and 5 that
describe the equilibrium that evolves under the current system of MID.
In the baseline, jurisdictions A and B differ initially only in their
exogenous provision of public goods (Column 1 of Table 4). The higher
exogenous public good provision in jurisdiction A shapes the resulting
equilibrium. Households prefer a greater provision of public goods24 These studies were chosen to approximate implicit prices for the Boston SMSA. The
use of these ﬁgures relies upon the assumption that these implicit prices sufﬁciently ap-
proximate the implicit prices for Boston in 2000, which implies that those prices are in-
variant to the time and spatial displacement of our analysis. The sensitivity of the
analysis to these parameters has been tested by varying the implicit prices. The patterns
of behavior predicted by the model are generally robust. For example, halving the value
ofα does not alter the characteristics of the new equilibria or relative ranking of policy re-
forms. Further results are discussed in Section 5.2 on model sensitivity and are available
from the authors upon request.
25 In choosing a simulated sample size one faces a trade-off between small sample bias
and computational efﬁciency. For the baseline scenario we experimentedwith larger pop-
ulation sizes up to 10,000, but found no signiﬁcant changes in the characteristics of the
equilibrium.which increases demand for housing in A relative to B. Consequently,
the population of A is higher than the population of B, with 65% of all
households residing there (Column 2 of Table 4). As the supply of
housing in A is not inﬁnitely elastic, relatively stronger demand in A
drives the prices of housing in A above the prices in B. The purchase
price of housing (including property tax) is $7379 in A compared to
$5496 in B (Column 3 of Table 4).
Price differences between jurisdictions and tenure options precipi-
tate the stratiﬁcation of households. Column 4 of Table 4 conﬁrms that
households with relatively strong ownership preference, θ1, choose to
purchase housing while those with relatively weak ownership prefer-
ence rent housing. Similarly, as can be seen from column 5 of Table 4,
households that spend a relatively large proportion of their income on
housing, e.g. those with relatively high β, prefer lower housing prices
and tend to choose to reside in jurisdiction B. Since β is negatively
correlated with income, this reinforces segregation by income. As
shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, only 19% of households in the
lowest income tax bracket (1st) choose to live in A compared to 96%
in the highest tax bracket (6th). Consequently, the median income of
households in A is almost 3 times that of B (Column 7 of Table 4).
Within each jurisdiction some households rent while others own.
Recall from the calibration that households with higher incomes face
relatively lower loan-to-value ratios and, under the existingMID policy,
can itemize theirmortgage interest and property tax costs at a relatively
higher marginal rate. Accordingly, the marginal cost of purchasing
housing is lower for higher-income households and, ceteris paribus,
households with high incomes are more likely to become homeowners.
As shown in Columns 7 of Table 5, only 52% of households with incomes
below the standard deduction choose to own compared to 74% of
households in the highest income tax bracket. This result is consistent
with observed homeownership rates in Boston in 2000. Returning to
Table 4, the concentration of higher income households in A leads the
homeownership rate to be higher than in B (Column 8).
Recall from Eq. (5) that local property tax revenues depend on both
purchase prices and the total quantity of housing demanded in a juris-
diction. In the baseline equilibrium, higher property prices in A are
slightly offset by larger property sizes in B such that tax revenue per
household in A is marginally lower than in B; $22,266 and $22,344
respectively (Column 10 of Table 4). Larger local tax revenues translate
directly into higher levels of local government expenditure on the
endogenous public good. However, since median income is higher in
A than B, jurisdiction A beneﬁts from relatively larger provision of the
public good through a stronger peer effect (Column 11 of Table 4).
Overall, provision of the endogenous public good is higher in A, with a
school quality score of 498, than it is in B, at 379. Combined with the
exogenous public good provision this indicates that the index of public
goods provision is 32% higher in jurisdiction A. That difference in provi-
sion of the public good acts to further exaggerate the patterns of sorting
initiated by the initial difference in public goods provision.
4.3.2. 28% cap
Now let us consider how things changewhenMID is capped at a rate
of 28%. Under the new policy those households in the top three tax
brackets who had previously been able to itemize their expenditures
on mortgage interest and property tax at 31, 36 and 39.6% respectively,
would now be limited to itemizing at 28%. In the absence of other
adjustments, the cap raises the per-unit cost of housing for the 86% of
households in the top three income tax brackets that itemize MID on
their tax returns in the baseline. Characteristics of the new equilibrium
are presented in the second row of results in Tables 4 and 5.
The equilibrium outcome is the product of a number of forces: the
immediate impact of the reform is to reduce demand amongst existing
homeowners with a relatively strong housing preference. This reduc-
tion threatens to lower local expenditure on public goods through a
reduction in property tax revenues, which precipitates the relocation
of some renters from jurisdiction A to B, increasing housing demand
Table 4
Characterization of equilibria by jurisdiction.
Exogenous
public good
Population
share
Price of
housing
(inc. tax)
Mean preference
for
homeownership
Mean
preference
for housing
Mean
income
Median
income
Homeownership
rate
Mean property
size
Local
expenditure
Endogenous
public good
z POP (1 + τp)p Θ β y ymedian ρ h e q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Baseline
a. A. Purchase 4 0.49 7379 1.39 0.16 89,392 56,706 0.75 1.95 22,266 498
Rental 0.16 0.96 0.16 92,215 1.76
B. Purchase 3 0.25 5496 1.43 0.37 34,486 20,917 0.70 2.82 22,344 379
Rental 0.11 0.98 0.38 24,612 2.08
28% cap
b. A. Purchase 4 0.49 7456 1.39 0.16 89,392 56,554 0.75 1.95 22,498 499
Rental 0.16 0.96 0.16 91,882 1.75
B. Purchase 3 0.25 5565 1.43 0.37 34,486 20,913 0.70 2.85 22,651 380
Rental 0.11 0.98 0.38 24,159 2.04
20.3% ﬂat-rate tax credit
c. A. Purchase 4 0.49 7379 1.39 0.16 88,390 56,554 0.75 1.86 22,448 499
Rental 0.16 0.97 0.16 94,920 1.83
B. Purchase 3 0.23 5496 1.4 0.37 35,268 20,933 0.66 2.94 22,537 380
Rental 0.12 1.08 0.38 24,410 1.99
4.2% income tax rebate
d. A. Purchase 4 0.49 7482 1.39 0.16 89,052 56,706 0.76 1.94 21,747 496
Rental 0.16 0.95 0.16 93,296 1.78
B. Purchase 3 0.25 5564 1.43 0.37 33,929 20,917 0.71 2.78 21,819 378
Rental 0.10 0.96 0.38 25,548 2.15
$3620 new owner scheme
e. A. Purchase 4 0.61 8502 1.3 0.16 81,363 6371 0.93 1.80 23,102 500
Rental 0.05 0.93 0.14 190,694 2.84
B. Purchase 3 0.34 6437 1.31 0.37 30,433 20,593 0.99 2.62 23,501 381
Rental 0.00 0.93 0.38 89,601 5.59
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the population leads to highermedian incomes in both A and B (column
7, Table 4), and increases local expenditure on public goods in both
jurisdictions. Those affects combine in precipitating a rise in the endog-
enous public good (proxied here by school quality) of 1% in A (to a score
of 499) and 0.3% in B (to a score of 380). The slightly larger increase in
public good provision in A makes it more desirable relative to B, this
stimulates a rise in prices in order to avoid relocation of households
from B to A and maintain the balance of supply and demand. Overall,
property prices rise by roughly 1.04% in A and 1.23% in B despite the
removal of MID.
Comparing results in column 9 of Table 4 we can see that mean
rental property sizes fall; this is a consequence of the relocation of
households with relatively small housing consumption from A to B
and the rise in prices26. However, as anticipated we also see a contrac-
tion in mean housing consumption across tax brackets four to six (see
Table 5), however homeownership rates in A and B are left almost
entirely unchanged (identical to 2 s.f.).
It is worth taking a moment here to reﬂect on the adjustment in
prices. Intuitively, one might assume that the cap on MID increases
the marginal cost of housing for individuals in the top tax brackets,
which in turn leads to a contraction in their demand. It follows that
from this partial equilibrium perspective one would expect property
prices to fall. The equilibrium sorting model, however, shows that that
logic is incomplete and results in an erroneous conclusion regarding
the price impact of the policy. There are two key factors at play. First,
households can move between jurisdictions. Accordingly, while a
reduction in demand from the residents of a desirable area has the
immediate effect of pushing down prices, those same price falls will
encourage households from other jurisdictions to move into the area26 This is partly due to the assumption that thehousing stock is divisible and canbe easily
re-packaged, in reality this is like dividing a house into several ﬂats etc.driving up demand and, as a result, prices. Second, the endogenous
public good responds to changes in neighborhood composition and
tax revenues. As a result, a policy that initially stimulates relocation
can alter the relative provision of public goods across neighborhoods,
a change that in turn can drive secondary demand and price adjust-
ments. As demonstrated by our simulations, in an area where public
good provision rises, housing becomes more desirable and those
demand increases act so as to drive prices upwards.
Perhaps unexpectedly, despite policy reform constituting a signiﬁ-
cant (20%) reduction in federal government spending, within our simu-
lation the knock-on effects of a policy capping MID at 28% actually
precipitates general welfare increases for households in our simulated
population. The endogenous tenure choice aspect of our model allows
us to explore the impact of the policy change on patterns of renting
and owning. Our model suggests that the key driver of the welfare in-
crease provided by the 28% cap is the fact that a policy which increases
mortgage costs for high-income households has very little impact on
their demand for housing or homeownership. Consider theﬁnal column
of Table 5, the rise in public good provision leads to utility gains for
almost half of the households in the lowest tax bracket and themajority
of households in the second to fourth income brackets. Moreover,
despite being most directly and adversely affected by the cap, 78% of
households in the 5th and 6th income tax brackets experience gains in
utility, primarily through the increased local public good provision.
Table 6 presents a summary of the monetized changes of the policy
in terms of the federal budget deﬁcit, mortgage interest payments,
landlords' rents and households' willingness to pay. Willingness to pay
is calculated as the sum of the amounts of money that each household
would pay, or would require in compensation, in order to leave them
indifferent between their original position under MID and that after
the policy change. In addition to providing a 20% reduction in the deﬁcit,
the 28% cap leads to a rise in mortgage interest payments and substan-
tial gains in household welfare.
Table 5
Characterization of equilibria by income tax bracket.
Share renting
in A
Share
owning in A
Share
renting in B
Share
owning in B
Mean
property size
Mean property
size of owners
Homeownership
rate
Mean endogenous
quality
Cost of
policy
Share gaining
utility
AR AO BR BO h ho ρ q C ↑U
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Baseline
a. 1st lowest 0.093 0.093 0.389 0.426 0.48 0.24 0.52 392 0
2nd 0.100 0.294 0.193 0.413 1.04 0.71 0.71 417 62
3rd 0.158 0.477 0.101 0.265 1.74 1.29 0.74 446 403
4th 0.172 0.632 0.031 0.165 2.49 2.06 0.80 467 1136
5th 0.202 0.648 0.035 0.115 3.29 2.60 0.76 471 2060
6th highest 0.258 0.702 0.000 0.040 4.44 3.44 0.74 484 3304
28% cap
b. 1st lowest 0.093 0.093 0.389 0.426 0.48 0.24 0.52 402 0
2nd 0.102 0.294 0.191 0.413 1.06 0.74 0.71 427 79
3rd 0.160 0.477 0.099 0.265 1.74 1.30 0.74 456 409
4th 0.172 0.632 0.031 0.165 2.48 2.06 0.80 476 1081
5th 0.206 0.648 0.031 0.115 3.28 2.60 0.76 481 1532
6th highest 0.258 0.702 0.000 0.040 4.43 3.44 0.74 494 2275
20.3% ﬂat-rate tax credit
c. 1st lowest 0.185 0.000 0.815 0.000 0.49 0.00 0.00 402 0
2nd 0.091 0.305 0.147 0.457 1.09 0.83 0.76 427 330
3rd 0.142 0.493 0.099 0.266 1.78 1.35 0.76 455 662
4th 0.175 0.629 0.038 0.158 2.46 2.00 0.79 475 1020
5th 0.209 0.641 0.038 0.112 3.19 2.43 0.75 481 1226
6th highest 0.280 0.680 0.009 0.031 4.18 2.91 0.71 494 1473
4.2% income tax rebate
d. 1st lowest 0.056 0.130 0.296 0.519 0.47 0.30 0.65 400 0
2nd 0.100 0.294 0.195 0.411 1.04 0.71 0.71 425 46
3rd 0.158 0.477 0.101 0.265 1.74 1.29 0.74 453 247
4th 0.172 0.632 0.031 0.165 2.49 2.06 0.80 473 614
5th 0.202 0.648 0.035 0.115 3.30 2.60 0.76 479 1222
6th highest 0.258 0.702 0.000 0.040 4.45 3.44 0.74 492 3792
$3620 new owner scheme
e. 1st lowest 0.000 0.194 0.000 0.806 0.72 0.72 1.00 404 1743
2nd 0.000 0.407 0.002 0.591 1.12 1.12 1.00 429 1058
3rd 0.000 0.648 0.000 0.353 1.74 1.74 1.00 458 935
4th 0.034 0.770 0.007 0.189 2.46 2.37 0.96 477 585
5th 0.119 0.742 0.021 0.119 3.19 2.78 0.86 483 353
6th highest 0.236 0.724 0.000 0.040 4.31 3.51 0.76 495 80
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A seemingly more progressive reform of MID would be to replace
the current systemwith a refundable ﬂat-rate tax credit. Under this pol-
icy, rather than being able to claim MID against income tax, the federal
government reimburses all homeowners a ﬁxed percentage of their
mortgage interest payments. To maintain comparability with the MID
cap reform discussed in the last section, we consider a refundable tax
credit of 20.3% which leads to the same overall deﬁcit reduction as the
cap.
In contrast to capping MID, the introduction of a tax credit has
immediate implications for all households. In the absence of any otherTable 6
Monetary value of policy reform ($).
Reduction in
Federal debt
Change in mortgage
interest
Change in
landlord rents
Willingness
to pay
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a. 28% cap
388,900 13,850 0 6,596,200
b. 20.3% ﬂat-rate tax credit
388,900 −3510 282,400 −4,770,600
c. 4.27% income tax reduction
388,900 13,050 36,300 −712,280
d. New owner scheme
388,900 −7,066,400 −2,626,500 −779,730adjustments, the marginal cost of purchasing housing reduces for
households in the lowest two tax brackets and all non-itemizers. For
itemizers in the top four tax brackets the marginal cost rises. For the
top tax brackets, the MID cut is more severe than under the cap
(down to 20.3% compared to 28%). Accordingly, as in the case of the
cap, the reduction in MID leads to a contraction in housing demand
amongst previous owners in the top tax brackets. At the same time,
demand from households in the 2nd and 3rd tax brackets expands.
Most interestingly, in jurisdiction B expanding demand from house-
holds in the 2nd and 3rd tax brackets forces lower income households
out of homeownership, leading to a reduction in the homeownership
rate to 66% and a rise in the number of house units per homeowner in
B (see Table 5). This effect is partially a product of the minimum
house sizes that must be purchased to reap the gains from home-
ownership under the chosen functional form, in addition to the higher
cost of owning relative to renting per unit of housing. Lower income
households taking advantage of the tax credit also stimulates demand
for homeownership in A, offsetting the contraction in demand from
higher income households. The homeownership rate remains stable at
75% and the average number of housing units per homeowner falling
only slightly from 1.95 to 1.86.
Moderate rises in tax revenues combined with an increase in the
median income in jurisdiction A lead to small gains in public good pro-
vision with school quality rising by 1% in both A and B. This increased
public goods provision provides some compensation for households in
light of the higher cost of housing.
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choice of almost 6% of the population. The progressive nature of the pol-
icy makes it unsurprising that the majority of the beneﬁts are focused
upon the lowest three tax brackets. What is surprising, however, is
that a smaller proportion of households in the second and third income
tax brackets beneﬁt from the tax credit in comparison to the 28% cap. In
addition, more substantial increases in the cost of housing result in
losses for 66% of households in the top three income tax brackets.
As can be seen in Table 6, the ﬂat-rate tax credit produces large
reductions in welfare through higher costs of housing for renters and
previous itemizers in the top four tax brackets; however the reform
also leads to a reduction in total mortgage interest payments as overall
homeownership rates decline. In comparison to the 28% cap, the ﬂat-
rate tax credit provides utility gains to a smaller proportion of house-
holds in every tax bracket except the 2nd and from a Kaldor–Hicks
perspective the ﬂat-rate policy is inferior to the 28% cap.
4.3.4. 4.2% income tax rebate
Consider next a policy that removes MID and uses the money saved
ﬁrst to reduce federal expenditure (by 20% to maintain comparability
with the 28% cap) and second to reduce income taxes by cutting all
household's tax bills by 4.2%.
For non-itemizers and renters, the design of this reform is potential-
ly positive. Their lower income tax liability opens up the possibility of
consuming larger properties or relocating to A to enjoy relatively higher
levels of public good provision. For homeowners, the immediate impact
of the reform depends on their taxable income. Households in the low-
est tax bracket do not pay income tax and, as such, are not immediately
affected by the policy reform.
The characteristics of the new equilibrium are presented in Tables 4
and 5. Overall, mean owned property size in B falls slightly as new
owners purchase smaller properties than existing owners. The reform
motivates a number of households to relocate from A to B in order to
beneﬁt from the relatively cheaper housing. This leads to an increase
in the median income in both A and B and higher local tax revenues,
supporting an increase in local public good provision. As a result, pur-
chase prices rise by 1.5% to $7482 in A and 1.26% in B to $5564 as low
income households (those in the ﬁrst and second income tax brackets)
enter the purchase markets. In jurisdiction B, higher housing demand
increases homeownership by 1% (column 8, Table 4). However, lower
demand from existing homeowners is not offset by the rise in price
and increase in rental demand, as a result lower tax revenues contribute
to a slightly decreased provision of endogenous public good in both
jurisdictions.
Despite its seemingly regressive design, this policy increases utility
for the majority of lower income households. For many higher income
households, the utility beneﬁts of the income tax cut are outweighed
by the loss in MID. Indeed, the proportion of households in the top
four income tax brackets who gain from this policy reform is lower
than under the 28% cap.27 Finally, considering Table 6, the income tax
rebate reform increases mortgage interest payments and landlord's
rental revenues, but createsmoderate net reductions inwelfare, relative
to the other reforms, through the higher housing costs that are inﬂicted
on wealthier households.
4.3.5. $3620 new owner scheme
This ﬁnal policy reform replacesMIDwith a new owner scheme that
pays a lump sum of $3620 to new homeowners. Again, this is revenue
equivalent to the 28% cap. The characteristics of the new equilibrium
under this policy appear in the ﬁnal rows of Tables 4 and 5.
As with the other reforms, the removal of MID has the immediate
effect of contracting housing demand amongst existing homeowners.27 Although administrative costs are not explicitly included in this model, it would be in-
teresting to see future work considering the additional advantage of the tax reduction's
lower administrative demands and knock on effects for the labor market.The introduction of a New Owner Scheme, however, stimulates entry
into homeownership amongst previous renters in the lowest tax brack-
et (as can been seen in columns 2 and 4 of Table 5). Simultaneously, the
New Owner Scheme increases total housing demand and leads to a rise
in purchase prices in both jurisdictions, rising by 15.2% in A and by 17.1%
in B (column 3, Table 4). In turn, we observe decreases in the average
units of housing demanded in the purchase markets, an increase in
the average units of housing in the rental markets and substantially
higher tax revenues in both jurisdictions. Despite relocation between
A and B reducing median incomes in both jurisdictions, the provision
of endogenous public goods rises by 2% in A and B (column 11,
Table 4). Accordingly, previous homeownerswho lose theMID are com-
pensated in twoways: ﬁrst, since property prices rise, they beneﬁt from
capital gains and second, they beneﬁt from increased levels of public
good provision.
While focusing on new owners, this policy reform results in welfare
gains for households in the ﬁrst three income tax brackets. The key
pathways through which those gains are delivered is by supporting
the movement of lower income households into homeownership and
increasing property values and local tax revenues, thus facilitating a
greater provision of local public goods. Despite this, the policy repre-
sents the greatest reductions in utility for homeowners in the top two
income tax brackets: these households face the complete removal of
MID and are ineligible for the New Owner Scheme. In addition,
persisting renters facewelfare losses as a result of higher house (rental)
prices. Returning to Table 6, we observe that the New Owner Scheme
produces large reductions in landlord's rental revenues and household
welfare.5. Discussion
This paper contributes methodologically to the existing equilibrium
sorting literature by developing a model that incorporates an explicit
endogenous tenure decision as well as endogenous local public goods.
These innovations extend the range of policy problems to which ESMs
can be applied to include those where tenure choice and the impact of
policy reform on rates of homeownership are central. Moreover these
innovations allow us to account for the inﬂuence of capital gains and
housing stock constraints on the distribution of welfare changes.
A simpliﬁed model was calibrated using real world data to examine
the possible consequences of reforms to the policy of MID in the U.S.
This exploration begins to shed some light on the complex patterns of
change that such reforms may precipitate in the property market and
provides insights that help to inform some of the more acrimonious
disputes surrounding the debate over MID reform. With regard to that
debate, the calibrated simulations show that the impact of removing
MID depends crucially on the nature of the policy that takes its place.
First, consider the argument that MID inﬂates property prices mak-
ing homeownership less affordable (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002). The
simulation results suggest that while MID disproportionately reduces
the cost of purchasing housing for higher income households, we do
not ﬁnd evidence to suggest that reforming MID would necessarily
lead to reductions in house prices. To the contrary, our simulations indi-
cate that entry into homeownership and greater public good provision
could lead to rising property prices.
Second, supporters of MID argue that removing the policy would
damage homeownership rates. This is where the key innovation of our
model, the introduction of endogenous tenure choice, enables us to
make a signiﬁcant contribution to the policy debate. Our simulations
suggest that the impact of reform on homeownership may be positive
or negative. Indeed, for the cap, income tax reduction and New Owner
Scheme we predict increased homeownership rates as new incentives
for homeownership are introduced. Furthermore, despite the fact
that the model accommodates changes in tenure as the relative costs
of renting and owning change, we predict quite small changes in
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rebate.
Third, critics of MID argue that it subsidizes excessive housing
consumption amongst wealthy households, suggesting that the remov-
al of MID would lead to a contraction in the average property size of
owners in the top tax brackets. As with the homeownership rate, our
simulations suggest that the nature of the policy reform has a strong in-
ﬂuence on the mean property sizes demanded by homeowners in each
income tax bracket. Contrary to previous predictions, however, in the
cases of the 28% cap and the income tax rebate the mean property size
demanded by homeowners in the top income tax bracket remains the
same. In the cases of the ﬂat-rate tax credit and New Owner Scheme,
our conclusions are consistent with a reduction in the average pur-
chased property size for households in the top income tax bracket.5.1. Model sensitivity
The model presented in this paper provides a tool for analyzing
policy reforms and exploring the types of market adjustments that
would characterize the resulting equilibria. It is important to acknowl-
edge that the calibrated model approximates many dimensions of the
joint housing, tenure and location decision that are notwell understood.
To test the robustness of the simulation results, and to identify themost
inﬂuential parameters we explored a variety of parameter values for
i) the endogeneity of local public good provision, ii) the speciﬁcation
of housing supply, iii) the degree to which rental and owned property
markets are connected, iv) household preferences, and v) the tax
incidence of property taxes for renters. For the purpose of conciseness
a selection of these results, exploring the ﬁrst two points, is presented
in Table 7, further results are available from the authors upon request.Table 7
Model sensitivity testing.
Endogenous
homeownership
feedback
Housing supply
speciﬁcation
Policy
rate
% change in
price in A
% cha
price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
28% cap
a. i. Calibrated endogenous
local feedback
i. Fixed 28% 1.10 1.7
ii. Elastic Cobb–Douglas 28% 0.47 0.8
ii. Homeownership as a
proxy
i. Fixed 28% 1.04 1.2
ii. Elastic Cobb–Douglas 28% 1.10 1.2
iii. Inverted endogenous
feedback
i. Fixed 28% 0.83 1.8
ii. Elastic Cobb–Douglas 28% 1.21 2.0
Flat-rate tax credit
b. i. Calibrated endogenous
local feedback
i. Fixed 20.3% 0.14 −2.8
ii. Elastic Cobb–Douglas 20.1% −0.10 0.1
ii. Homeownership as a
proxy
i. Fixed 20.1% −0.02 −0.0
ii. Elastic Cobb–Douglas 20.1% −0.02 −0.0
iii. Inverted endogenous
feedback
i. Fixed 20.1% 0.00 12.5
ii. Elastic Cobb–Douglas 20.1% 0.00 12.5
Income tax rebate
c. i. Calibrated endogenous
local feedback
i. Fixed 4.27% 1.40 1.3
ii. Elastic Cobb–Douglas 4.27% 1.32 1.5
ii. Homeownership as a
proxy
i. Fixed 4.27% 1.50 1.2
ii. Elastic Cobb–Douglas 4.27% 1.48 1.2
iii. Inverted endogenous
feedback
i. Fixed 4.26% 1.36 1.3
ii. Elastic Cobb–Douglas 4.26% 1.34 1.3
New owner scheme
d. i. Calibrated endogenous
local feedback
i. Fixed 3620 13.25 20.8
ii. Elastic Cobb–Douglas 3620 12.82 20.9
ii. Homeownership as a
proxy
i. Fixed 3620 15.22 17.1
ii. Elastic Cobb–Douglas 3620 15.16 17.0
iii. Inverted endogenous
feedback
i. Fixed 3665 14.68 20.4
ii. Elastic Cobb–Douglas 3660 14.60 20.4Table 7 compares three speciﬁcations of local public good provision;
i) calibrated feedback via local homeownership, ii) state level home-
ownership as a proxy and iii) an inverted calibration of the feedback
effects, alongside two speciﬁcations of the housing supply function;
i) ﬁxed short term housing supply and ii) Cobb–Douglas housing supply
function with elasticity of one.
Across the range of calibrated parameter values, including those
not presented in Table 7, we ﬁnd consistent patterns of change in
homeownership rates, predominantly with increases in homeowner-
ship rates being achievable through a deﬁcit reducing policy reform.
This is consistent with Shapiro and Glaeser's (2003) assertion that
MID subsidizes households whowould be homeowners even in the ab-
sence of the policy. Likewise, our simulations consistently demonstrate
that increases in public goods provision under several of the reforms
serve to compensate households for the reduction in federal spending;
the magnitude of this compensation is sensitive to the value of prefer-
ences for public goods, α. Nonetheless, despite this sensitivity, our re-
sults consistently suggest that the proposed 28% cap leads to utility
gains for the majority of households and would be supported, from a
utility perspective, by themajority of households. Moreover, our results
suggest that the beneﬁts of the policy would be quite broadly distribut-
ed across the income tax distribution (see columns 8–13 of Table 7).
In contrast, the impacts of MID reform on property prices and the
average property size of homeowners are sensitive to the calibration
of the model. In the simulation results presented in Section 4 we ﬁnd
that property prices do not decrease and the average property size of
owners in the top tax brackets decreases. This ﬁnding is quite robust
for the cap, income tax rebate and New Owner Scheme. However, for
the ﬂat-rate tax credit and in calibrations where either rental and pur-
chase markets have been deﬁned independently or renters do not face
the full property tax burden, the model predicts that property pricesnge in
in B
% change in
homeownership
rate in A
% change in
homeownership
rate in B
Share of tax bracket gaining utility
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
8 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.70 0.76 0.81 0.78 0.80
8 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.70 0.76 0.81 0.78 0.82
3 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.71 0.76 0.81 0.78 0.78
0 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.71 0.76 0.82 0.78 0.80
7 0.00 0.01 0.44 0.70 0.74 0.79 0.77 0.75
0 −0.01 0.00 0.52 0.71 0.76 0.79 0.78 0.79
5 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.70 0.43 0.23 0.08 0.02
4 0.00 −0.04 0.00 0.72 0.43 0.23 0.08 0.02
3 0.00 0.01 0.48 1.00 0.73 0.42 0.33 0.28
3 0.00 0.01 0.48 1.00 0.73 0.42 0.33 0.29
0 −0.03 0.10 0.34 0.60 0.46 0.27 0.10 0.03
0 −0.03 0.10 0.34 0.60 0.46 0.27 0.10 0.03
7 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.53 0.65 0.49 0.42 0.57
1 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.55 0.66 0.44 0.40 0.58
6 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.48 0.62 0.44 0.45 0.58
6 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.48 0.62 0.44 0.45 0.58
2 0.01 0.03 0.21 0.54 0.62 0.47 0.40 0.58
2 0.01 0.03 0.21 0.54 0.62 0.47 0.40 0.58
0 0.18 0.30 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.68 0.61 0.76
7 0.18 0.30 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.69 0.61 0.76
1 0.18 0.30 1.00 0.83 0.69 0.32 0.15 0.05
3 0.18 0.30 1.00 0.83 0.69 0.32 0.15 0.05
6 0.18 0.30 1.00 0.88 0.71 0.48 0.35 0.44
0 0.18 0.30 1.00 0.88 0.71 0.48 0.35 0.44
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2008) and the average property size amongst homeowners in the top
tax brackets could increase under the 28% cap, ﬂat-rate tax credit and
income tax rebate reforms.
5.2. Concluding remarks
Examining a range of alternative policy reforms demonstrates the
importance of policy design and the role of path dependency in shaping
the outcome of those reforms. With regard to the latter, there are three
key mechanisms at work. First, owning a property shields high-income
households against rises in property prices and subsequently enables
them to channel beneﬁts through capital gains. Second, housing stock
constraints ﬁx the current capital stock of housing making it unrespon-
sive to price changes, these constraints act to suppress price falls and
stabilize homeownership in the face of contracting demand. Third, en-
dogenous public goods can act as a mechanism for compensating
households. As a result, the complex patterns of change precipitated
by policy reforms in the property market can have quite unanticipated
results. Policies designed to be progressive, such as the tax credit reform,
may do less to beneﬁt poorer households than those that appear to be
regressive, such as the income tax reduction reform. Likewise, policies
that economists would normally assume to have excellent efﬁciency
improving qualities, such as the income tax reduction reform, may
lead to signiﬁcant netwelfare losses. Taken as awhole, our investigation
suggests that several reforms to MID could maintain the prevailing
levels of homeownership while delivering more public goods and con-
tributing to a reduction in the federal deﬁcit.
Of course, these results relate to the calibration of a simpliﬁed two-
community problem. Given our results, it would be interesting to see
future work directed towards the estimation of a large-scale model
with more formally quantiﬁed social returns to homeownership. With
these extensions it would be possible to simulate economy-wide re-
sponses to the proposed reforms. Nonetheless, our results demonstrate
the usefulness of the modeling framework and provide important
insights into the broader implications of reforming MID.
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